In other words, we have this: (1) claim (right) of i⇔ duty of j or, in other words, an agent i has a legal right against an agent j that j performs action A if and only if I has a duty to do A in relation to i. (2) j of freedom i of (exhibition) law No⇔ or in other words, an agent j has a legal freedom vis-à-vis an agent i, A to do if and only if i does not have the right vis-à-vis j to prevent j from doing A and is therefore exposed to the freedom of j. One of Ronald H. Coase`s main contributions was to show how mainstream economics is based on a contradictory amalgam of expensive physical inputs and free institutional resources. and to give birth to the economy of institutions: each institution is a means of allocating and organizing the economic resources to be studied. Notably, none of the institutions (including the market) is a free meal. The Coasan approach views institutions as an expensive substitute and provides a fundamental starting point for comparative institutional analysis. However, Coase overlooked two problems arising from the observation that institutions are not free. First, when institutions are costly, consideration must be given not only to their possible substitutes, but also to how complementary institutions affect their costs, as well as the costs of possible institutional substitutes. Second, economic analysis should also take into account that the transition from one institutional framework to another cannot take place in low-cost meta-institutions. Initial conditions can have a significant influence on the final institutional arrangements. The novelty of Coase`s approach and its limitations have been greatly underestimated. In particular, costly institutional adoption requires considering economics as a historical discipline.
As its proponents and critics argue, economic liberalism is based on a separation of the “economic” and “social” dimensions of capitalism, reflecting disciplinary divisions between economics and sociology and regulatory divisions between markets and “externalities.” The paper summarizes the topics discussed at the ESRC symposia on rising powers and explores the competing ways in which the phenomenon of “externalities” has been conceived. First, externalities can be treated as rare events, “market failures,” which make calculation impossible and usually require some form of government intervention. Second, externalities can be treated as problems of ill-defined property rights or insufficient privatization. This is identified as a neoliberal position. Third, there are new methodological approaches and institutional models (especially in the urban economies of emerging powers) that reveal ambiguous mediation between public and private goods and between different spheres of value, without making them fully comparable. To know how this happens in practice, further empirical research is needed, as stated in the conclusion. * Professor at the University of Siena and the Central European University. A first draft of this paper was presented at the Berle III Symposium at Seattle University School of Law in January 2012. I thank the participants in this conference, especially Charles O`Kelley and Faith Stevelman, for their helpful comments.
I am also very grateful to the editors of Seattle University Law Review for their very helpful feedback and excellent handling of my article. Although economies, business practices and living standards have converged since World War II, business structures in the world`s advanced economies continue to differ. A look at the diversity of corporate structures of large companies around the world (and over time) would fascinate Charles Darwin. This thesis develops a critical review of the literature on the political determinants of corporate governance through Darwinian theory (including some Lamarckian aspects). Just as Darwin explains in his book On the Origin of Species the diversity of species of tortoises, finches and iguanas of the Galapagos Islands, Darwinism can contribute to understanding the origin and persistence of corporate diversity. In particular, this paper examines the variations dictated by policies, their legacy, and the subsequent selection of beneficial attributes of the business. Summary – The company can be seen as the centralization of market transactions and the decentralization of public policies that allows the management of common liabilities.