This is emblematic of the duty of global companies to anticipate and resolve recurring tensions between the ethical standards of global business and the requirements of national legislation. This conflict over a number of issues has been significant in the past and, in my view, will become increasingly important in the future as globalization progresses and companies try to establish a uniform ethical culture around the world, but inevitably – and constantly – faced with conflicting national laws. In rare cases, maintaining the international standard may mean “breaking the law in the most ethical way.” In addition, States and NSAGs often change their behaviour throughout the conflict, often resulting in an increase or decrease in their compliance with IHL. This is particularly evident during ceasefire or peace processes, when parties can seek political recognition in front of local constituencies or international audiences, while another scenario can be observed when they are actively involved in hostilities, a time when they can try to show their military strength. The parties to armed conflicts are indeed dynamic and evolving actors: they are not the same Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) who fought in the 60s and 70s who concluded the peace agreement with the Colombian government in 2016, since it was not the same Colombian government either. To illustrate this, the ICRC explicitly pointed out that the FARC-EP stopped abducting civilians “from the beginning of the peace negotiations” (p. 41). It has also been shown that attacks on civilians by the Lord`s Resistance Army (LRA) decreased during peace negotiations with the Ugandan government, and then increased government concessions immediately after the government`s refusal (p. 265). Focusing on GAANE, Wood noted that civilian victimization is expected “at times when [an armed group`s] viability is threatened or when it faces significant military setbacks” (p. 15).
These cases, at least at these times, indicate that there was an effective command and control structure. In other words, decisions taken by NSAG managers as to whether they comply with an IHL rule would in fact be taken by its members. The second category of factors goes beyond rationality and instead focuses on emotions. Here, attention is paid to the individual level. In fact, it can be said that the behaviour of NSAG states and combatants is based on past experiences and learning processes. A rational perspective would argue that repeated IHL training should lead to better results in the field (p. 74). But, as Buis rightly observed, “consideration depends on a number of factors that transcend the limits of the law.” State and non-State combatants are indeed human beings, which makes it difficult to exclude an emotional component when judging their conformity with a legal regime, including international humanitarian law. Emotions that have been associated with violence against civilians include shame, disgust, resentment, and anger (p.
58). Complaints from people who have been affected by past or present violations of IHL, if not properly addressed, can also contribute to perpetuating the cycle of violence. On the other hand, proper handling of these can prevent such cycles or at least reduce their effects. As a result, respect for IHL can also be examined through the prism of the following emotional factors: And I think there are basically two reasons for that. First, I believe that international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions have indeed stood the test of time and have undoubtedly contributed to reducing the suffering of populations in armed conflict. We do not see this so much, and of course we must not ignore the suffering that exists, but there is no doubt that the Geneva Conventions saved lives and that States were not swept away by idealism, even in the normative sense, when they accepted the Geneva Conventions in 1949. They have agreed on conventions that do not require the impossible, that strike this balance between military necessity and, as you said, do not prohibit war, allow states to pursue their military objectives, but at the same time offer a principle of humanity to balance the principle of military necessity. And then, over the years, you have developed more war crimes for which there is so-called permissive universal jurisdiction, that is, for which states can enact universal jurisdiction without violating the sovereignty of other states when they pursue these violations. You know, it`s one — it`s another way of applying international humanitarian law.